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URING the Survey period, Texas courts heard numerous claims
brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Act' (DTPA). To recover under the DTPA, a plain-
tiff must establish that he is a "consumer," that a false, misleading or
deceptive act occurred, and that this act was a producing cause of his
damage.2 The significant decisions reported during this Survey period ad-
dressed each of those elements as well as other issues such as waiver and
preemption. This article discusses those cases.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
A. PROPER PLAINTIFFS-THE CONSUMER
The first element that a plaintiff suing under the DTPA must establish
is that he is a "consumer."' 3 Whether a plaintiff is a consumer is a ques-
tion of law for the courts to decide.4 In Melody Home Manufacturing Co.
v. Barnes,5 the Texas Supreme Court stated that in order to qualify as a
consumer, a plaintiff must meet two requirements: (1) the plaintiff "must
have sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease;" and (2)
"the goods or services purchased or leased must form the basis of the
complaint."'6 Texas courts use this two-step analysis to determine a plain-
tiffs consumer status.
1. Step 1: Did the Plaintiff Seek or Acquire Goods or Services By
Purchase or Lease?
When the plaintiff has not purchased or leased the goods or services at
issue, courts have analyzed the plaintiffs consumer status using an in-
tended beneficiary theory.7 Under this theory, a plaintiff must be related
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1996) [hereinafter DTPA].
2. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995). See
also DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
3. DTPA § 17.50. A consumer is defined as:
[A]n individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or
agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or
services, except that the term does not include a business consumer that has
assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation
or entity with assets of $25 million or more.
§ 17.45(4).
4. 3Z Corp. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 851 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1993, writ denied).
5. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
6. Id. at 351-52 (citing Sherman Simon Enters., Inc. v. Lorac Serv. Corp., 724 S.W.2d
13, 15 (Tex. 1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)).
7. The intended beneficiary theory evolved from the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1985). In Kennedy, the court observed that the
existence of contractual privity between the plaintiff and defendant is not a factor in decid-
ing whether the plaintiff is a consumer as contemplated by the DTPA. Id. at 892-93. In-
stead, the court thought that such a determination should be determined by the plaintiff's
relationship to the consumer transaction. Id. at 893. While the Kennedy plaintiff had not
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to the consumer transaction to the extent that the purchaser intended for
him to benefit from the purchase or lease of the good or service. 8 Ac-
cordingly, a plaintiff who lacks privity to the consumer transaction can
only attain DTPA consumer status if the purchaser intended that he ac-
quire the benefit of the transaction.
As in years past, Texas courts have not allowed employees to attain
consumer status for transactions their employers consummated. 9 In
Clark Equipment Co. v. Pitner,'0 the Houston Court of Appeals reviewed
a verdict awarded an employee for $750,000. In this personal injury
case," Pitner brought suit against Clark, as designer and manufacturer of
the forklift, and Southline, as the distributor, for DTPA violations as well
as other claims. At trial, the court entered a judgment for Pitner.' 2 Clark
appealed the judgment.
In one of the points of error, Clark alleged that the evidence failed to
support a finding that Pitner was a consumer for DTPA purposes. The
Houston Court of Appeals noted that an employee qualifies as a con-
sumer only if the employer's intended purpose for purchasing or leasing
the good, in this instance the forklift, was to benefit the employee.' 3 The
court further stated that if the employer's purchase or lease of the good
or service was instead intended primarily for the benefit of the em-
ployer's business, and only benefits the employee incidentally, then the
employee does not qualify as a DTPA consumer.14 The court reasoned
that Pitner's employer had purchased the forklift for the ordinary opera-
purchased the group life insurance policy that formed the basis of his complaint, the
supreme court held that he had "acquired" its benefits because his employer, the policy
purchaser, intended that it provide him with coverage. Id. at 892. Because the plaintiff had
acquired the benefits of the policy, the court held that he qualified as a DTPA consumer.
Id.; see also Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420, 1426-27 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the son of a woman who bought a garage door opener for him was a con-
sumer under the DTPA because her intended purpose in purchasing it was to benefit the
son).
8. See Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892-93.
9. See Eve L. Pouliot, Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, An-
nual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 871, 876-77 (1996) (discussing Figueroa v.
West, 902 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) and Nabors Loffland Drilling Co.
v. Martinez, 894 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied)) [hereinafter Pou-
liot, 1996 Annual Survey]; Eve L. Pouliot and William Christopher Carmody, Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1113, 1115-16 (1995)
(discussing Brandon v. American Sterilizer Co., 880 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994,
no writ)) [hereinafter Pouliot & Carmody, 1995 Annual Survey].
10. 923 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
11. As part of her employment, Pitner was driving a forklift. She was driving down a
ramp when the forklift failed mechanically. She jumped off the runaway forklift and sus-
tained injuries.
12. Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 121.
13. Id. at 128 (citing Kitchener v. T.C. Trailers, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D. Tex.
1988), Brandon, 880 S.W.2d at 492, and Lara v. Lile, 828 S.W.2d 536, 542 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)).
14. Id. (citing Lara, 828 S.W.2d at 542). But cf. Lewis & Lambert Metal Contractors,
Inc. v. Jackson, 914 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994), vacated, 938 S.W.2d 716
(Tex. 1997) (The court of appeals held that employees acquired repairs to employer's venti-
lation system by requesting the repairs and relying on the defendant's representations that
the system was repaired and safe. The supreme court vacated the court of appeals judg-
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tion of its business, and therefore any benefit Pitner enjoyed was merely
incidental.' 5 Accordingly, under the intended beneficiary theory Pitner
did not qualify as a consumer.16 The court sustained Clark's point of er-
ror and modified the $750,000 judgment to eliminate treble damages,
legal fees and costs that had been awarded pursuant to the DTPA.17
2. Step 2: Do the Goods or Services Purchased or Leased Form the
Basis of the Plaintiffs D TPA Complaint?
After the plaintiff meets the first requirement of the Melody Home
analysis, he must go on to show that the good or service purchased forms
the basis of his complaint. Texas courts have developed a narrow view of
what constitutes a good or service.' 8 Courts require that the good or ser-
vice the plaintiff complains of is the primary good or service that the con-
sumer sought or acquired in the underlying transaction. The consumer
must meet this requirement in order to have a valid DTPA claim. 19
a. An Authorized Dealership Agreement Did Not Provide a DTPA
Service
In Fisher Controls International, Inc. v. Gibbons,20 the court of appeals
reviewed whether Gibbons had acquired the actual services he com-
plained of in his petition. Fisher manufactured and distributed valves and
instruments. Gibbons acquired Alaska Controls, Inc. (ACI), which was
the sales representative for Fisher products in Alaska. Upon acquiring
ACI, Gibbons secured a three-year contract with Fisher allowing ACI to
continue to be the sales representative of Fisher products. At the end of
that three year period, Fisher refused to renew their agreement for sev-
ment without reviewing the merits, and remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment
in accordance with the settlement agreement of the parties. Id. at 716.).
15. Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 128.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. The DTPA defines a good as "tangible chattles or real property purchased or
leased for use." DTPA § 17.45(1). See Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421, 428 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that stock certificates are not goods); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603
S.W.2d 169, 173-75 (Tex. 1980) (holding that an applicant who seeks nothing more than
money from a lending institution is not a DTPA consumer because money is not a good);
Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 497-98 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (an option contract is not a good); Johnson v. Walker, 824 S.W.2d
184, 187 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied) (an agreement to become an insurance
sales agent is not a good or service, but merely the intangible right to sell defendant's
product); Portland Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619
S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (certificates of deposit are
not goods); Snyders Smart Shop, Inc. v. Santi, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (accounts receivable are not a good); see also Joel W. Reese,
Note, "Consumer" Status Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act Requires a Borrower to
Base its Claim on the Underlying Goods or Services: Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First
City, Texas-Bryan, 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied), 23
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 593 (1992).
19. Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, 747 S.W.2d 873, 876-77 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
20. 911 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ requested).
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eral reasons. Gibbons sued Fisher for fraud and DTPA violations. After
a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment for Gibbons for approxi-
mately $4.62 million.21
On appeal, the court reviewed Gibbons' consumer status. The court
noted that Gibbons purchased an intangible property right when he en-
tered into the Representative Agreement which allowed ACI to act as
Fisher's sales representative. 22 The court distinguished Gibbons' Repre-
sentative Agreement from a "franchise" agreement. One typically associ-
ates a franchise agreement with the collateral services contemplated by
such an agreement. 23 The court found that any such collateral services
Fisher agreed to provide under the Representative Agreement were
merely incidental to the transaction and not a primary objective of their
agreement. 24 Because the court held that the services of which Gibbons
complained, the right to renew his agreement with Fisher, was not the
primary service sought or acquired by ACI in the underlying Representa-
tive Agreement transaction, ACI did not qualify as a consumer under the
DTPA.25
b. Money Is Not a Good For DTPA Purposes
In Maginn v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc.,26 the Maginns applied for a mort-
gage loan from Norwest. On May 18, 1993, Norwest informed their real
estate agent that the couple's credit report was acceptable, but that final
approval of their loan was contingent on a number of different factors.
The Maginns claimed that Norwest told them that their loan for more
than $100,000 would be made by the end of June. On June 23, 1993,
however, Norwest informed the couple's real estate agent that their loan
had been declined.
The couple brought suit against Norwest on a variety of claims, includ-
ing DTPA violations. The trial court, however, granted summary judg-
ment on their DTPA claim because the couple did not qualify as a DTPA
consumer.27 The Maginns appealed, alleging that they were consumers
because of the various banking services they sought ancillary to their loan
application.28
To support their ancillary services argument, the couple relied on
Herndon v. First National Bank of Tulia.29 In Herndon, the loan appli-
21. Id. at 137.
22. Id. at 139. "The purchaser of such an intangible business right is usually not a
'consumer' under the DTPA, unless qualifying 'collateral services' are an objective of the
transaction and not merely incidental to the purchase." Id. (citing Texas Cookie Co., 747
S.W.2d at 876-77) (emphasis added). "In other words, the goods or services acquired must




26. 919 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
27. Id. at 165.
28. Id. at 166.
29. 802 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
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cant claimed to have sought a number of financial services from the
lender, such as advice on when, where, and whether to obtain financing,
as well as how to structure any such financing. The Herndon court con-
cluded that the bank's financial advice constituted services for DTPA
purposes.30
Because a loan is not normally considered a good or service for DTPA
purposes,31 the Austin Court of Appeals had to determine whether
Norwest's actions in evaluating the couple's credit history and assisting in
the closing of the home's sale constituted "services" as contemplated by
the DTPA.32 The court had previously determined that "the key princi-
ple in determining consumer status is that the goods or services
purchased must be an objective of the transaction, not merely incidental
to it.''33 The court then drew a distinction between this case and the
Herndon case.
The Maginn court found that financial advice on when, where, and
whether to borrow for business operation and how to structure any such
financing is not typically incidental to a loan, but more likely an in-
dependent objective of any loan.34 In the case at bar, however, the court
determined that the ancillary services acquired by the Maginns served no
purpose other than to facilitate the loan process.35 Norwest's services
were merely incidental to the loan and did not form the basis of the un-
derlying consumer transaction. Thus, the couple did not qualify as DTPA
consumers, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment on the DTPA claim.36
B. PROPER DEFENDANT-THE SELLER/LESSOR
1. An Upstream Supplier is Not a Proper Defendant Unless It Made
the Alleged Misrepresentations in Connection With the Consumer
Transaction
Once again, the Texas Supreme Court denied indirect purchasers a
DTPA remedy.37 Last year, the supreme court held that indirect purchas-
ers could not use the DTPA as an end run around the antitrust laws.38
This year it held that an indirect purchaser cannot reach up into the chain
of production and sue entities who never made any representations di-
rectly to him. 39
30. Id. at 399.
31. Riverside Nat'l Bank, 603 S.W.2d at 174-75.
32. Maginn, 919 S.W.2d at 166.
33. Id. (citing First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 929 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ denied) (emphasis in original).
34. Maginn, 919 S.W.2d at 167.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Pouliot & Carmody, 1995 Annual Survey, supra note 9, at 1119-21 (discussing
cases involving indirect purchaser arguments).
38. Abbott Lab., Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 505-07 (Tex. 1995); see also Pouliot,
1996 Annual Survey, supra note 9, at 879-81 (discussing Segura decision).
39. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996).
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In Amstadt, the supreme court reviewed three cases brought by home-
owners against the manufacturers and suppliers of polybutylene plumb-
ing systems for negligence and violations of the DTPA.40 In each case the
court of appeals had held that United States Brass Corporation and the
other defendants could be held liable for DTPA violations concerning
their polybutylene plumbing systems. The court of appeals had deter-
mined that a link existed between the representations made about the
systems and the use of the systems in the plaintiffs' homes-the defen-
dants were "inextricably intertwined" with the homebuilders. 41 Noting
that the Legislature created the DTPA to protect consumers in their
transactions and to encourage them to litigate claims that otherwise
would not be economically feasible, the Texas Supreme Court clarified
that the defendant's alleged misrepresentations must have occurred in
connection with a consumer transaction.42 Because none of the defen-
dant's alleged misconduct occurred in connection with a consumer trans-
action-the homeowner's purchase of a home, the court reversed the
court of appeals, keeping in line with its new trend towards limiting the
ever-expanding DTPA.43
In State Industries v. Corbitt,44 a homeowner sued the manufacturers of
both his water heater and drain valve for damage caused by the valve's
failure. At trial, the jury found in favor of the homeowner, Mr. Corbitt. 45
40. Knowlton v. United States Brass Corp., 864 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1993), rev'd sub nom., Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.
1996); Barrett v. United States Brass Corp., 864 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst.
Dist.] 1993), rev'd sub nom., Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.
1996); United States Brass Corp. v. Andraus, No. 01-89-00614-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 19, 1993) (not designated for publication) 1993 WL 313208, rev'd sub nom.,
Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996).
41. Andraus, 1993 WL 313208 at *7; Barrett, 864 S.W.2d at 621; Knowlton, 864 S.W.2d
at 594. The concept of "inextricably intertwined" or "tie-in" relationships originated in
cases attempting to hold lenders liable for DTPA violations. See Qantel Business Sys., Inc.
v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988) (explaining that a "tie-in" or
"inextricably intertwining" between seller and lender may cause plaintiff to be a consumer
with respect to both the financing company and the seller of the goods). The theories focus
on the fact that both the lender and the seller benefit from the underlying transaction.
42. Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 649 (citing Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d
535 (Tex. 1981)) (The Act is designed to protect consumers from any deceptive trade prac-
tices made in connection with the purchase or lease of any goods or services) (emphasis in
original). The court stated that "[w]hile our words have varied, the concept has been con-
sistent: the defendant's deceptive trade act or practice is not actionable under the DTPA
unless it was committed in connection with the plaintiff's transaction in [purchasing/leasing]
goods or services." Id. at 650 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 650-52. The court went on to note the homeowners still had a DTPA cause
of action against the seller of their homes, General Homes, and that General Homes had
an action for contribution and indemnity against the defendants. Id. at 652 (citing DTPA
§ 17.555). Therefore, it concluded that the Legislature intended for consumers to have
recourse under the DTPA against those with whom they have engaged in a consumer
transaction; then to the extent that liability attaches upstream in the chain of supply, the
seller may seek contribution or indemnity from them. Id. This decision allows the con-
sumer immediate relief against the seller while limiting the expansive reach of the DTPA,
and is in keeping with the efforts to restore the DTPA back to its original purpose-to
provide a remedy for the wronged small consumer.
44. 925 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
45. Id. at 306.
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The manufacturers appealed. Having recently been overruled on this
point, the Houston Court of Appeals found that the manufacturers were
upstream suppliers whose alleged misconduct did not occur in connection
with Mr. Corbitt's purchase of his home, and reversed the portion of the
judgment awarded for DTPA violations.46
2. A Proper Defendant Must Have Received Benefits From the
Underlying Consumer Transaction
While a plaintiff may be able to establish "consumer" status with re-
gard to a transaction, he cannot necessarily "sue anyone when the deal
goes bad."'47 The defendant must have sought to enjoy the benefits of the
transaction. 48 In Inglish, the plaintiff failed to establish that the bank
sought to enjoy any benefits from his purchase of cattle because the evi-
dence established that the seller had merely listed the bank as a refer-
ence.4 9 Because the bank had not sought any benefits from the cattle
purchase transaction, the court affirmed the propriety of the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing Inglish's DTPA claims.50
III. ACTIONABLE CONDUCT UNDER THE DTPA
A. DTPA ACTION OR BREACH OF CONTRACr
1. Breach of Contract or a False, Misleading or Deceptive Act?
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the dis-
tinction between a breach of contract and a false, misleading or deceptive
act or practice under the DTPA. In Crawford v. Ace Sign, Inc.,51 a Yel-
low Pages representative made certain promises to the president of Ace
Sign during its negotiations to renew the company's advertisement.
Crawford, the representative, told Ace Sign's president that if he paid in
full now, the company's advertisement would appear in the 1989-90 direc-
tory. While Ace Sign paid in full, the advertisement did not appear in the
1989-90 directory. Ace Sign sued Crawford and Southwestern Bell not
only for breach of contract and negligence, but also for violations of the
DTPA.5 2
On appeal, Crawford and Southwestern Bell claimed that Ace Sign
only had a claim for breach of contract and not for DTPA violations. In
deciding whether the plaintiff's claim amounts to just a breach of con-
46. Id. at 311 (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 646, 648).
47. Inglish v. Union State Bank, 911 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1995) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 234, 1997 WL 7275 (Tex. Jan. 10,
1997) (not released for publication). The supreme court determined that the court of ap-
peals did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Thus, it dismissed the appeal, making
the trial court's judgment final.




51. 917 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1996).
52. Id. at 13.
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tract, a court must decide whether: (1) the claim is for breach of duty
created solely by the contract rather than a duty otherwise imposed by
law; and (2) the injury is only the economic loss to the subject matter of
the contract itself.53 On review, the supreme court held that Crawford's
statements "were nothing more than representations that the defendants
would fulfill their contractual duty to publish, and the breach of that duty
sounds only in contract. '5 4 Accordingly, Ace Sign failed to establish a
DTPA claim.
2. Breach of Contract or Breach of an Express Warranty?
During the Survey period, the Houston Court of Appeals reviewed
whether the facts presented in Humble National Bank v. DCV, Inc.,55
arose to a breach of warranty or a breach of contract. DCV banked with
Humble National Bank. In 1988, DCV's bookkeeper, John Bingman, be-
gan stealing from the company. He would prepare DCV checks payable
to the Humble National Bank, bring the checks to the bank, and have the
bank exchange them for cashier's checks payable to ABCA, Inc., a com-
pany created by Bingman. When DCV discovered the embezzlement
scheme, it filed suit against the bank for its alleged participation in the
scheme. DCV sued the bank for breach of contract, conversion, negli-
gence, and violations of the DTPA.56 The trial court entered judgment
for DCV based on the jury's finding that the bank breached an express
warranty under the DTPA.57 The bank appealed.
The DTPA neither contains warranties nor defines the term.5 8 A war-
ranty must be established independent of the DTPA.59 One establishes
that an express warranty existed if he can prove that the "seller ma[de] an
affirmation of fact or a promise to the purchaser, which [was] relate[d] to
the sale and warrant[ed] a conformity to the affirmation as promised. '60
Accordingly, the court first had to determine whether the bank made any
express warranties to DCV.
DCV's argument relied on the language of the bank's policy regarding
resolutions. A resolution gives authority to an individual to act on behalf
of the corporation in its transactions with the bank. Because Bingman
did not have authority to act on its behalf, DCV alleged that the bank had
failed to honor its resolution policy. DCV alleged that the language used
in the policy created an express warranty. The court analyzed the lan-
guage and determined that it "merely referred to the basis upon which
53. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. 1991).
54. Crawford, 917 S.W.2d at 14.
55. 933 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).
56. Id. at 228.
57. Id.
58. Enterprise-Laredo Assoc. v. Hachar's Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 830 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio) (citing La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)),
writ denied per curiam, 843 S.W.2d 476 (1992).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp. N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the Bank agreed to determine who was authorized to act on the com-
pany's behalf. ' 61 As such, the court held that the contract created the
duty to honor the company's resolution, and that the Humble National
Bank's failure to honor the resolution caused DCV only economic dam-
ages. 62 Accordingly, it held that DCV's cause of action stemmed from
breach of contract and not from breach of an express warranty, which
would have given rise to a DTPA claim.63
IV. PRODUCING CAUSE
In order to recover damages under the DTPA, the consumer must
prove that the defendant's conduct was the producing cause of his dam-
age.64 A producing cause is "an efficient, exciting or contributing cause,
which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages. '65 While the
law does not require reliance or foreseeability, 66 some causal connection
must exist between the deceptive act and the damage suffered. 67 A pro-
ducing cause is a substantial factor which brings about an injury and with-
out which the injury would not have occurred. 68
A. CRIMINAL CONDUCT Is A SUPERSEDING CAUSE OF DAMAGE
In Wheaton Van Lines v. Mason, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals re-
viewed a $1.3 million judgment to determine if Wheaton Van Lines'
(Wheaton) involvement was the producing cause of Mason's damage. 69
In Wheaton, Mason moved from one apartment to another within the
same complex. Aware of Wheaton's reputation as a national company,
he looked in the Yellow Pages until he found their name. However, Ab-
solute De-Lux, a local moving company, paid for and placed the adver-
tisement Mason found. Absolute De-Lux had an agency contract with
Wheaton which allowed it to take orders for interstate moves on behalf of
Wheaton and perform intrastate and local moves itself. Since Mason's
move was local, Absolute De-Lux and its employees performed his move.
After the move, Mason discovered that a box of musical compact discs
(box of CDs) was missing. He notified Absolute De-Lux. Absolute De-
Lux performed an investigation and found that two of its employees had
seen another employee, Michael Mullinax, with the box of CDs shortly
after the move. The next time Mullinax contacted Absolute De-Lux he
was in jail in another city on unrelated charges. He merely called to ask
61. DCV, 933 S.W.2d at 234 (citing Enterprise-Laredo, 839 S.W.2d at 831).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
65. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975). There can, however, be more
than one producing cause of damages. Id.
66. See Allied Towing Serv. v. Mitchell, 833 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ).
67. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 602-03.
68. Boys Clubs, 907 S.W.2d at 478.
69. 925 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
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that his paycheck be sent to his wife. While Absolute De-Lux agreed to
send the check to his wife, they also told him that they wanted the box of
CDs returned and that this check would be his last because they were
firing him for theft of Mason's box of CDs.
Approximately one week later, Mullinax pounded on the door of Ma-
son's new apartment. As Mason desperately called 911, Mullinax broke
down the door and attacked him with a butcher knife. Mullinax cursed
Mason for accusing him of stealing the box of CDs. Mason had left the
phone off the hook so that 911 could trace and record his call. When the
police arrived they arrested Mullinax, who was later convicted of at-
tempted murder. Mason sued Absolute De-Lux and Wheaton for the at-
tack, alleging negligent hiring and violations of the DTPA. The trial court
entered judgment for Mason on the basis of his DTPA claims.70
On appeal, Wheaton claimed that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port the jury's finding that its alleged false, misleading and deceptive act
was the producing cause of Mason's injuries. Noting that "[a]t some
point in the causal chain, the defendant's conduct may be too remotely
connected with the plaintiff's injury to constitute legal causation," 71 the
court analyzed whether Wheaton's involvement was too attenuated of a
connection. The court held that "the criminal act of Michael Mullinax
exacting his vicious revenge on Mason seven days after being terminated
from Absolute De-Lux and eleven days after moving Mason was an inter-
vening cause sufficient to break the chain of causation between Whea-
ton's misrepresentations, if any, and Mason's personal injuries. '72
In Cianfichi v. White House Motor Hotel,73 the wife of a hotel guest
who was murdered while staying at the hotel sued the hotel for negli-
gence and DTPA violations. In Cianfichi, Mr. Cianfichi checked into the
White House Hotel. He left the hotel and walked to the nearby Astro-
dome to watch a baseball game. The next morning, as he was getting
ready to leave the hotel, he was shot by two unidentified gunmen. He
crawled to the phone in his room and called the front desk for help. The
clerk called 911. An ambulance brought Mr. Cianfichi to the hospital, but
he died in surgery. His wife sued the hotel for DTPA violations, alleging
that the signs which the hotel had posted on the premises misrepresented
the adequacy of its security services. 74
The evidence showed that Mr. Cianfichi was a long-haul trucker who
traveled often. While the evidence did not establish that he saw the secur-
ity signs, it did show that he liked to stay at the White House Hotel be-
cause of its proximity to the ballpark. In fact, he had stayed at the hotel
70. Id. at 726.
71. Id. at 728.
72. Id. at 729. Noting the similarities between the Boys Clubs case and the one at bar,
the court also stated that Wheaton's involvement may have furnished "an attenuated con-
dition that made the injury possible;" however, Mullinax's actions were a superseding
cause of the damage. Id.
73. 921 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
74. Id. at 442.
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six or seven times prior to the hotel's posting of the signs and installation
of its security cameras. Accordingly, the court found that the evidence
failed to support a finding that the signs were a substantial factor in bring-
ing about Mr. Cianfichi's death.75 Because the signs were not found to be
a producing cause of his death, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's refusal to submit jury questions on the DTPA.76
V. PREEMPTION
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the issue of preemption in Redman
Homes, Inc. v. Ivy.7 7 In Redman Homes, the Ivys' brought suit against
Redman when an electrical fire destroyed the Redman mobile home that
they had purchased. Redman provided its customers with a written lim-
ited warranty covering the home's plumbing, heating, and electrical sys-
tem as well as pre-installed appliances for one year. Because the fire
occurred within the Ivys' first year of ownership, they brought suit. A
jury found against Redman on the Ivys' claims of negligence and DTPA
violations.78 Redman appealed, alleging that the National Manufactured
Home Construction and Safety Standards Act (NMHCSSA) preempted
the couple's state law claims.79 The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, and the supreme court reviewed this decision.80
The NMHCSSA requires a mobile home manufacturer to obtain a cer-
tificate of compliance, which certifies that the home complies with the
federal standards promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. The manufacturer must obtain this certificate before it can
transport or sell the mobile home. Redman contended that because the
Ivys' mobile home possessed a certificate of compliance and because the
NMHCSSA preempts state law claims, the Ivys could not obtain a judg-
ment under state law. The court evaluated the NMHCSSA's specific pre-
emption clause to determine whether it indeed preempted the Ivys' state
law claims. 81
Because the Ivys' claim did not allege that Redman should have ad-
hered to a higher standard than that imposed by Federal law, the court
stated that the "plain language of the NMHCSSA does not sustain
75. Id. at 444 (citing Boys Clubs, 907 S.W.2d at 481).
76. Id. "Like the plaintiffs in Boys Clubs, Mr. Cianfichi's relationship with the hotel
developed independently from the alleged misrepresentation." Id.
77. 920 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996).
78. Id. at 666.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The NMHCSSA contains the following express preemption clause:
Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard
established under this [chapter] is in effect, no State or political subdivision
of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect,
with respect to any manufactured home covered, any standard regarding
construction or safety applicable to the same aspect of performance of such
manufactured home which is not identical to the Federal manufactured home
construction and safety standard.
42 U.S.C.S. § 5403(d) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1996).
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Redman's position." 82 Further, the NMHCSSA contains a savings clause
which preserves common-law causes of action.83 Finally, the Texas
Supreme Court held that "the Ivys' claims do not frustrate Congress's
intent in enacting the NMHCSSA, which was to improve quality and to
reduce personal injuries and property damage resulting from accidents
involving mobile homes."'84 Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the
court of appeals rejection of Redman's preemption argument.85
In Worthy v. Collagen Corp.,86 the Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed a
similar issue. Worthy underwent plastic surgery where the doctor in-
jected her with a cosmetic device known as Zyderm. Collagen manufac-
tures Zyderm, which is a collagen implant material. Complaining that she
suffered damage from the injection, Worthy filed suit against Collagen.
The trial court awarded Collagen summary judgment, agreeing that the
Medical Device Act (MDA) preempted Worthy's claims.87
On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether the MDA
preempted Worthy's claims, a question of first impression in Texas. 88 The
MDA contains a specific preemption clause.8 9 Worthy claimed that
Zyderm was not safe and fit for the ordinary purpose of its intended use
and therefore, Collagen, its manufacturer, had misrepresented its product
in violation of the DTPA. Because her claims sought to require Collagen
to either meet a requirement different from or in addition to the
premarket approval requirements imposed by the MDA, the court held
that her claims fell under those meant to be preempted by section
360k(a) of the MDA.90 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment on this issue. 91
VI. WAIVER
The Tyler Court of Appeals reviewed the waiver issue as it relates to
82. Redman Homes, 920 S.W.2d at 666.
83. Id at 667 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5409(c)) (stating that "[clompliance with any Federal
manufactured home construction or safety standard issued under this [chapter] does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law)."
84. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5401).
85. Id. at 666-67.
86. 921 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ granted).
87. Id. at 713.
88. Id. at 715.
89. 21 U.S.C.S. § 360k(a) (Law Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1996). The section provides that
absent the grant of an exemption,
no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this [chapter] to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
[chapter].
Id.




DTPA claims.92 G. Richard Goins Construction Company (GCC)
purchased an undeveloped lot in a planned residential community called
the Pinnacle Club from S.B. McLaughlin Associates (SBMA). SBMA
was the owner and primary developer of the Pinnacle Club. When
SBMA failed to develop the Pinnacle Club as expected, GCC filed suit
against it, alleging DTPA violations. 93
While the jury found that SBMA had violated the DTPA causing GCC
$174,000 in actual damages, it also found that GCC either waived its right
to recover under the DTPA and/or brought suit after the statute of limita-
tions had expired. 94 As a result, the trial court entered a take nothing
judgment. GCC appealed. 95
GCC argued that it could not have waived its DTPA cause of action.
Under the applicable provision, a consumer's waiver is generally contrary
to public policy, and therefore, void and unenforceable. 96 Accordingly,
the court of appeals sustained GCC's point of error on the waiver issue.97
However, because the court found merit in SBMA's defense of limita-
tions, it affirmed the trial court's judgment.98
The issue of waiver also arose in the Houston Court of Appeals.99 In
Rosen, the plaintiff Richard Rosen participated in an amateur drag race.
During the race, his car flipped over and burst into flames. Rosen sued
both the National Hot Rod Association and the Houston Raceway Park,
alleging negligence, gross negligence and DTPA violations.100 The defen-
dants moved for summary judgment on all of Rosen's claims because he
had executed a release and indemnity agreement before participating in
the race.' 0 ' The trial court granted summary judgment, and Rosen
appealed. 10 2
92. G. Richard Goins Constr. Co. v. S.B. McLaughlin Assocs., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. App.-yler 1996, writ denied).
93. Id. at 126.
94. Id. at 126-27.
95. Id. at 127.
96. DTPA § 17.42. "This anti-waiver provision of the DTPA applies to both waiver
occurring during a transaction and post-transaction waiver by conduct." G. Richard Goins
Constr., 930 S.W.2d at 127 (citing Poe v. Hutchins, 737 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Note however, that the outcome may have been different under
the amended DTPA provision, which allows a consumer to waive its DTPA rights under
specified conditions. DTPA § 17.42. A consumer can now execute a valid waiver of its
DTPA rights, as long as the waiver meets the following requirements: (1) it is in writing;(2) the consumer signed it; (3) the consumer was not in a significantly disparate bargaining
position; and (4) legal counsel represented the consumer in the transaction in question.
DTPA § 17.42(a)(1-3). While the facts do not reveal whether a written waiver existed in
this case or whether legal counsel represented GCC in the transaction, the GCC/SBMA
transaction occurred prior to the 1996 amendment. Thus, the amended provision is
inapplicable.
97. G. Richard Goins Constr., 930 S.W.2d at 127.
98. Id. at 127-29.
99. Rosen v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, No. 14-94-00775-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication), 1995 WL 755712.





While Rosen correctly contended that his DTPA claim was not subject
to the defense of waiver, he never raised this defense in the trial court.
Because the court of appeals found that the Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment encompassed all of Rosen's claims, including the DTPA,
it held that he erred in failing to raise this issue in his Response to Defen-
dants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 103 Accordingly, the court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment. 10
VII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, courts once again heard several DTPA
claims. In Amstadt,l05 the Supreme Court of Texas stood firm in its re-
fusal to acknowledge an indirect purchaser as a DTPA consumer. This
decision falls right in step with the current trend of both the courts and
the legislature toward limiting the expansive reach of the DTPA. Ac-
cordingly, one should anticipate such narrowing interpretations of the
statue in the year to come.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id. The moral of this story is age old and timeless: Always assert every possible
argument into a response to a motion for summary judgment that may be applicable.
105. 907 S.W.2d at 503; see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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